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Summary Abstract 
Supply chain growth, and their dependence on Information Technology (IT), is making cyber 
risks an increasingly unmanageable threat through traditional risk assessment methods. 
Systemic analysis methods have been identified as alternatives to traditional methods. This 
paper analyzes the application of a systemic risk analysis methodology to understand cyber 
risks in the supply chain. A generic supply chain is analyzed, and information flows, dynamic 
structures and the influence of cyber-attack on these are identified. This paper argues that a 
systemic approach is more efficient in detecting vulnerabilities, enabling an evolving 
disruption response process and culture in the supply chain. 
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Introduction 
In recent years, supply chains have increasingly grown in complexity, coupled by their 
dependence on Information Technology (IT), in becoming what has been defined as cyber-
physical systems, or the embedding of IT in applications in the real world (Gollmann et al., 
2016). Although this complexity has allowed a faster operation and frontier-less 
communication, it has also exposed supply chains to new vulnerabilities (Manuj et al., 2008) 
because of the increased number of nodes and connections present in the cyber supply chain 
(Dederick et al., 2008). Disruptions resulting from these vulnerabilities have been placed at 
US 300 billion in losses and, not surprisingly, cyber-attacks have been identified as one of 
the most important risks in the supply chain (WEF, 2013).  
Cyber risks in the supply chain, i.e., those risks associated with the use of IT, differ 
substantially from other supply chain risks that may be present. Some of these differences 
are summarized in Table 1, including aspects such as physical location, complexity 
limitation, and anonymity. 
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Table 1: Cyber versus Physical Risks in the Supply Chain 
Physical Supply Chain  
(Flow of goods) 
Cyber Supply Chain  
(Flow of Information) 
Physical location is relevant Physical location is 
irrelevant 
Anonymity is uncommon Anonymity is common 
Limited complexity Unlimited complexity 
Buffers are useful Buffers are risky 
Mainly components risk Mainly interaction risks 
 
Companies have been managing risks in their supply chains through causal chain analysis 
techniques, primarily with a focus on its physical dimension, such as Failure Tree Analysis 
(FTA), Failure modes and criticality analysis (FMECA), or through probabilistic methods. 
For systems with limited complexity and mainly focused on component performance, these 
techniques have been useful.  
However, two main issues stand out. First, with the increase in supply chain complexity, 
these techniques are increasingly onerous to implement and maintain. In order to consider all 
potential modes of failure, important resources are required to create these traditional risk 
analyses or to maintain them as existing risks change or new ones appear. Second, Supply 
chain IT development has allowed both a decrease in the individual supply chain component 
failure, as well as an increase in the number of interaction failures in the supply chain.  
This means that a supply chain can fail even if all its components worked as expected, as 
the risk is materialized in the interaction between these components, situation that would be 
invisible to traditional methods, centered on component reliability and direct contributing 
factors to the specific risk. This is rendering traditional risk methods increasingly inadequate 
for the complex systems in which they need to be used. The following table summarizes 
some of the reasons why traditional approaches are insufficient for the modern supply chain. 
 
Table 2: Traditional way versus their insufficiency 
Traditional way Reason for insufficiency 
Focus is on structure-to-risk Nothing is said about reaction-to-risk 
Focus is on components Nothing is said about the interaction 
between these components 
Prepares organization for specific 
risks 
Organization needs to react to any 
risk 
Human effects are centered 
around operator error 
Human effects can lead to risk even 
if no operator error is made 
Assumes a constant structure Structure is changing continuously 
 
A first aspect for inquiry is exposed at this point, regarding other tools that might exist to 
deal with these insufficiencies. This paper proposes additional approaches that may 
complement traditional analyses, and which might bridge the insufficiencies listed above 
addressing not only preparation for cyber-risks, but also reaction to cyber risks, i.e., cyber-
resilience. 
Additional to causal chain and probabilistic analyses, a third approach has been proposed 
in literature to understand risk, namely systemic risk analysis. This approach seeks to change 
the problem management from one of individual component reliability (i.e., each part of the 
supply chain functions as it is supposed to do), to a control problem of the complete relevant 
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supply system. Techniques such as the Systems Theoretic Accident Model & Processes 
(STAMP) have been used areas such as product development, and manufacturing operations, 
and its advantages and outcomes have been well documented for these cases (Altabbakh et 
al., 2014). However, systemic methods of analysis have been used to analyze supply chains 
only in a limited way. A second aspect of inquiry is thus the way in which systemic analyses 
of cyber risks, allow us to better understand and manage these risks in supply chains. 
 
Cyber resilience in supply chains 
According to Christopher and Peck, supply chain resilience is the ability of a supply chain to 
return to its original state or move to a new, more desirable state after being disturbed 
(Christopher et al., 2004). Supply chain resilience has thus evolved as an additional concept 
to supply chain risk. While risk management entails the examination of all possible outcomes 
of a process, weighing the potential returns against the potential risks of investment, 
resilience management characterizes organizational reaction to low probability / high impact 
events and unforeseeable disruptions to create competitive advantage (Petit et al., 2010). 
Literature has taken different perspectives to examine supply disruptions and resilience in 
supply chains, such as conceptual (Christopher et al., 2004), behavioral (Ellis et al, 2010), 
qualitative (Sheffi et al, 2005; Craighead et al, 2007), simulation/modelling (Wu et al., 2007; 
Nair et al., 2011), and network structure (Kim et al., 2015). Such a variety of approaches has 
enabled a number of different ways in which to understand the phenomenon, yet has also led 
to a degree of confusion about the level of analysis appropriate for different situations.  
All the approaches to supply chain resilience are static except for Sheffi and Rice’s 
proposal (Sheffi et al., 2005), which consisted of the application to supply chains of a 
disruption theory for production systems developed in Norway (Absbjornslett, 1999), 
proposing what was defined by them as the “disruption profile”. This approach is identified 
as dynamic since the response of the supply chain changes over time, and is qualitatively 
described through eight distinct phases of evolution, i.e., preparation, disruptive event, first 
response, initial impact, time of full impact, preparation for recovery, recovery, and long-
term impact (Sheffi et al., 2005). However, none of the definitions of resilience found in our 
literature review has considered system control as part of their definition. 
The other approaches to supply chain resilience describe the supply chain at a specific 
point in time, and are thus static in nature, akin to taking a picture of the current state of the 
supply chain resilience. Moreover, many of the definitions present in literature, such as Tang 
(Tang, 2006) or Longo & Oren (Longo & Oren, 2008), limit their contribution only to 
proposing a definition for resilience, without the subsequent suggestion of any qualitative 
description, or quantitative measure of this supply chain resilience. 
Starting from Sheffi & Rice’s approach, Khan and her team have proposed that the length 
and depth of the disruption can be considered as a direct indicator of the resilience of a 
process, as can be seen in Figure 1. If a process has a longer disruption in its performance 
and/or a performance disruption is greater, then it can be said to have a lower/weaker 
resilience (Khan et al., 2015). 
Although these measures might make sense for simple systems, it is not clear if they will 
have similar effects to complex interconnected supply networks. For example, Kim and his 
team have already suggested that redundancy might hinder resilience for some supply 
network configurations (Kim et al., 2014). It has also been mentioned that redundancy can 
be effective systems consisting of purely electromechanical components. However, when 
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there is software involved as well as the interaction of human operators, redundancy can 
sometimes contribute to accidents through, e.g., design complexity (Leveson, 2011). 
 
Systemic risk analysis methods. 
The use of feedback loops for a systemic understanding of risk in industrial systems including 
the human component is not new. In 1998, the analysis of industries with high levels of 
hazard (Carroll, 1998), suggested that traditional solutions, although well-intentioned, fail to 
help through their unintended side-effects, as illustrated in the Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Common mitigation measures and their side effects (Carroll 1998) 
 
Kang and his team have used a systems approach to identify Limiting Conditions for 
Operation (LCOs in operations, extensible to supply chains (Kang et al., 2005). Their 
approach acknowledges three important aspects: 1) a system dynamics approach ensures a 
causal relationship in the establishment of the feedback loop structure, 2) the approach is 
useful for understanding the behavior of a complex system over time, and 3) a systemic 
approach is useful in conceptualizing a thorough understanding of human interactions within 
complex systems.  
More recently, Gahdge et al., (2013) proposed a systemic approach based on the three 
pillars of risk identification, risk assessment and risk mitigation. Through the generation of 
a system dynamics model containing different attributes and parameters, risks can be 
simulated and sensitivity analyses can be obtained on the relevance of each parameter. 
However, although the results and simulation clearly point out to a system dynamics model, 
it is unclear what feedback loops, delays and sources of inertia, i.e., stocks (Sterman, 2000) 
were considered. 
Garbolino et al. (2016) and his team used system dynamics modeling and risk analysis to 
propose a dynamic risk analysis method that includes both approaches. They acknowledge 
that this modelling approach focuses on the strengthening of constraints, and it allows a 
dynamic process where industrial systems continually adapt to external and internal changes 
to achieve their goals. They propose a ten-step approach that results in scenario analysis 
through a model. It is however restricted to a single plant and its internal process, thereby 
lacking the integration with other supply partners. 
Our research process did not find documented literature on the application of systemic 
risk analysis methods to supply chains. 
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Research Hypothesis 
This paper considers three main hypotheses that direct the choice and application of different 
frameworks for understanding cyber-risks in the supply chain. 
First, supply chains have structures that determine how they react over time to disruptions 
such as cyber-attacks. According to the System Dynamics approach, an observed behavior 
in a supply system is the result of an underlying structure (Forrester, 1961; Sterman, 2000). 
In a supply chain, these cause either the flow of physical goods (e.g., raw materials, physical 
products, and physical services) or a flow of information (e.g., Purchase Orders, Money, 
Coordination emails, digital products or services).  
Second, physical flow of goods is controlled by the information flow around that process. 
The physical flow follows the instructions laid down by the information flow in the supply 
chain. Closed loop control structures involve feedback loops (Doyle et al., 1992), and it is 
expected the same thing will happen for the case of supply chains.  
Third, cyber-attacks to a supply chain will necessarily affect its information flows, and 
involve one or more feedback loops, which are then later reflected as an operational 
disruption. 
 
Methodology 
The process that was followed for the analysis of a supply chain through a systemic risk 
analysis follows the STAMP model (Systems-theoretic Accident Model and Processes) as 
proposed by Leveson (2011). This paper does not explain the methodology, rather focuses 
on the results and consequences of its application to cyber risks in the supply chain. 
This is a model based on systems theory rather than traditional analytic reduction and 
reliability theory. A safe operation is seen as an emergent property resulting from the 
interactions of the components with each other and the environment. The problem of 
avoiding “accidents” (unplanned loss events) thus becomes a dynamic control problem. 
Figure 3 shows a control system representation of a controlled process. Only an extract of 
the analysis is shown. 
 
Results 
Control systems representation 
Let us consider a simple supply chain as a single-level transaction between a buyer and a 
seller, for the ownership of a product.  
This single-level supply chain already involves at least three members, i.e., buyer, seller, 
transporter, also known as “agents” (Swaminathan et al., 1998). Through such a process, a 
buyer will inform a seller that it wants to buy an item from them. The seller agrees, and 
contacts a transportation agent to move the product from the seller to the buyer. The 
representation of such a supply chain is a reflection of the information gathered on how such 
a supply chain is working, and is by definition, incomplete (Sterman, 2002). The information 
flow present in this simple supply chain is not linear and it requires many flows of 
information, between the different agents involved, as represented in Table 3. 
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Table 3 Information Flows in generic 1-level supply chain 
 
 
As it can be seen, these information flows are not isolated and in themselves may require 
a specific flow predecessor to take place. For example, in order that IFL-2 can happen 
(Purchase Order Confirmation) from the seller to the buyer, a previous purchase order 
information flow must have been emitted by the buyer to the seller, i.e., IFL-1. These create 
feedback loops, which can be identified in the following control loop diagram in Figure 2. 
The loops involved are mentioned in Table 4. 
 
Figure 2: Basic information supply chain (partial representation of flows). 
 
Table 4 Information Feedback Loops for a single-level supply chain 
 
 
 
Information Flow 
Number
Description Emiting agent Receiving Agent Required 
Predecesor
IFL1 Purchase Order (P.O.) Buyer Seller -
IFL2 P.O. Confirmation Seller Buyer IFL1
IFL3 Service Order (S.O.) Seller Transporter IFL2
IFL4 S.O. Confirmation Transporter Seller IFL3
IFL5 Pickup Coordination Transporter Seller IFL4
IFL6 Delivery Coordination Transporter Buyer IFL4
IFL7 Transport Documentation Transporter Seller IFL4
IFL8 Transport Documentation Seller Buyer IFL2
IFL9 S.O. Payment Seller Transporter IFL7
IFL10 S.O. Payment Confirmation Transporter Seller IFL9
IFL11 P.O. Payment Buyer Seller IFL8
IFL12 P.O. Payment Confirmation Seller Buyer IFL11
Control Loop Description
Information Flows (IFL) 
involved
L1 Purchase Order Loop IFl1 - IFL2
L2 Service Order Loop IFL3 - IFL4
L3 S.O. Payment Loop IFL9 - IFL10
L4 P.O. Payment Loop IFL11-IFL12
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Table 5: Analysis if unsafe control actions from a cyber-attack (Extract) 
UCA Desc. Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
UCA
#1 
Send Service 
Order to 
Transport 
Agent 
Seller does not 
send service order 
to transport agent, 
when there has 
been a confirmed 
purchase order 
 
Transport agent 
does not receive 
the service order 
sent by the seller. 
Seller sends service order 
confirmation to buyer with 
the wrong product 
specification.  
 
 Buyer receives the 
purchase order 
confirmation with the 
wrong product 
specification.   
 
Seller sends purchase order 
confirmation considering 
inaccurate stock 
information. 
Seller sends 
service 
order to 
transport 
agent too 
late to 
arrange a 
timely 
pickup/deli
very 
not 
applicab
le 
(Service 
Order is 
either 
sent or 
not) 
UCA
#2 
Send 
Purchase 
Order 
confirmation 
to buyer 
Seller does not 
send the purchase 
order 
confirmation to 
buyer when there 
has been a 
purchase order 
received. 
 
Buyer does not 
receive the 
purchase order 
confirmation sent 
by the seller 
Seller sends purchase order 
confirmation to buyer with 
the wrong product 
specification. 
 
Buyer receives the purchase 
order confirmation with the 
wrong product 
specification. 
 
Seller sends purchase order 
confirmation considering 
inaccurate stock 
information. 
Seller sends 
the 
purchase 
order 
confirmatio
n to buyer 
before 
identifying 
existing 
stock. 
Not 
applicab
le 
(Purchas
e Order 
Confirm
ation is 
either 
sent or 
not) 
UCA
#3 
Send service 
order 
confirmation 
Transport Agent 
does not send the 
service order 
confirmation to 
the seller when 
there has been a 
service order 
received 
 
The seller does 
not receive a 
service order 
confirmation, 
when it has issued 
a service order to 
the transport 
agent. 
Transport agent sends 
service order confirmation 
with wrong specifications 
which are then later 
confirmed with buyer 
Transport 
agent send 
service 
order 
confirmatio
n to seller 
too late to 
make 
timely 
pickup 
arrangemen
ts 
Not 
applicab
le 
(Service 
Order 
Confirm
ation is 
either 
sent or 
not) 
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Hazard Analysis 
For a generic, single-tier supply chain, the accidents and unacceptable losses in the case of 
cyber-attacks to supply chains have to be defined. This is highly dependent on the specific 
supply chain, and in the case of a generic supply chain example, a few examples are 
mentioned in the following table. 
 
Table 6: Unacceptable accidents in the supply chain (extract) 
Accidents Description 
A1 No product is delivered to customer due to cyber-attack 
A2 Wrong product is delivered to customer due to a cyber attack 
 
The system as defined has different control actions, for the hazards that can be identified. 
These can have four types of dangers. (Leveson, 2011). Type 1: The control action is present, 
thus causing an unsafe conditions; Type 2: The control action is absent, thus causing an 
unsafe condition; Type 3: The control action was applied to early or too late, thus causing an 
unsafe condition, and Type 4: The control action was applied to little or too much, thus 
causing an unsafe condition. 
An extract of the type of analysis that can be achieved for a generic supply chain, starting 
from each Unsafe Control Action (UCA) is shown in the following Table 5.  
 
Discussion 
This paper proposes a detailed and concise way of representing the flow of 
information/communication for a simplified, generic supply chain. This representation was 
based on the identification of the relevant supply system, the agents interacting in the supply 
system, the communication paths, and the resulting feedback loops. Control structures were 
identified in the supply chain as a result, based on the communication flows present. 
The example presented in this paper is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of a 
supply, but rather sought to show the application of a systemic risk analysis technique to the 
case of cyber risks in the supply chain.  
This is a novel approach and does not contradict other static frameworks for resilience 
(Christopher et al., 2003), and builds from the original “disruption curve” by Sheffi & Rice 
(Sheffi et al., 2005), expanding the theory by proposing mechanisms through which this 
behavior over time is achieved in a supply chain after a cyber-attack (cyber-resilience).  
The proposal of a control structure for supply chains is consistent with other equivalent 
structures that have been studied in different fields of knowledge. 
The explicit representation of information flows through an information flow map, has 
been shown to enhance team productivity and effectiveness. From this simplified system 
representation, four relevant insights can be derived. First, some information flows may not 
be present. This should trigger analyses on the need to include or exclude them. Second, 
some information flows will not be part of a loop. This might be the reflection of a fixed 
procedure in place. If there is control required on these flows, then a loop has to be completed. 
Third, there may be redundant information flows. This should be looked at carefully to 
identify the situations where this dual information flow might lead to a risky situation. Fourth, 
some of these information flows may not be electronic, thus not subject to cyber hacking, yet 
also not subject to electronic recording or with the possibility of automated control. 
Some recommendations can be derived from this work.  
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• Understand the information flows in your supply chain.  
• Control structures involving information flows in supply chains span over different 
areas of the company, requiring the interaction of different departments during a cyber-
attack.  
• The focus of the management of cyber-risks should also include the management of 
the systemic structure (requirements and constraints) as well as interactions, both high 
leverage options, and not merely the static structure and correcting of behavior.  
• The process of hazard and requirements identification is an ongoing, cumulative 
process that is adjusted by new hazards as these are identified and integrated into the 
analysis. 
Some of the insufficiencies mentioned in Table 2 are initially addressed through the use 
of this methodology for the case of supply chains. The focus is on reaction-to risk, it describes 
explicitly the interactions between components and can integrate redundancy as source of 
cyber-risks. 
 
Conclusions and future work 
This paper develops a first approach to represent the response of supply chains to disruptions 
caused by cyber-attacks, and proposes a structured methodology for the identification of 
vulnerabilities and the constraints that condition this supply chain response.  
The analysis results in some general recommendations for constraints and requirements. 
The main areas where future work is recommended include the application to ex-post 
examples, the quantification of the effects of different factors and their relationship to the 
resulting cyber-resilience of the supply chain, and performance testing under different 
scenarios for varying requirements and constraints. 
This approach to understanding cyber risks as a dynamic control problem needs to be 
implemented ex-ante for other cases, to identify constraints. There is also a potential for a 
network representation of the information flows, and of researching potential applications of 
network theory for understanding the existing relationships in supply chains. 
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